Conceptual ironing out of exocentrism

When I think about right and wrong what strikes me as being true is not a normative index of maxims or principles that one can live their life according to or measure their behaviour against. What strikes me as true is an ontological orientation that is fundamentally exterus that is, it is exocentric not endocentric. However this is not to be confused with externalization, extrojection or other psychodynamic terms refering to the dialectic relationship with the "Other" , the non-ego. Externus is a primary state, a basic preposition of the Other but not concerned with the Other specifically. It is a cognitive oriention or in a phenomenological sense, the horizon of ones outward viewpoint. Morality is located in externus. Not outside of ones self or within the Other but merely in externus. The vagueness is essential because to define it any futher would be to project and interact with the concept; it would amount to placing an object on the horizon and thus taking away from the horizon itself. Externus, by itself, is inherently prescriptive since any morality defined within it's scope must be in externus. Ego must not be present nor any psychological or psychodynamic linkages. Externus is devoid of such limitations. it is transcendant and ideal. A univeral principle, as a description, might be applicable but only it's neccessary universal quality. And although ideal, it is ontologically self-evident, even ontogenic. Does any of this help clarify what is right and wrong? Well, when I make a determination about such I gage how externus the choice is. It might be neccessary to start with ego but it is possible to excise ego from such calculas. Assuming self-preservation is an instinctual motivator, i wittle my self-preserving motivations down to an elemental basis. There, I determine the degree to which the decision is endocentric compared to exocentric. If further to externus then the decision is more moral and vice versa. None of this speaks to the neccessity of following through with moral choices but merely in the categorization of the choices themselves. My psychosis is far more interested in taxonomy than axiology or deontology in and of themselves.